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Empirica1 Resu1ts
The first step of the estimation procedure involves estimating the reduced form probit, as given by Eq. (16). The resul ts are set OU"t in the first.
two columns of estimating wage change equations. The results are given in Table 3. .-13 -"l"ab1e 2
EstiIIIated decision equations
Reduced form Structural form Note: Figures in parentheses showestimated mean wage increases for workers with observed characteristics identical to those of actua1 movers and actua1 stayers, respecti vely. The di fferences between those estimates and actual mean wage growth rat.es for the two groups are dueto the censoring effects. The estimates in column (2) and column (4) of Table 3 ha ve been used.
-19estimable structural decision equation. The resul ts are displayed in 'the last three col umns of Of special interest here to see whether workers respond to their potential wage gains. .As is shown in the table, the coefficients for and have the expected signs and wit:h (absolute) t-values around 2. An increase in gm by l percent.age point implies an increase in the probabili ty of moving by 0.05 (Table 5) . Likewise, an increase in g by s . l percentage point will reduce the mobility probability by 0.07. ,Iob mobility decisions are clearly affected by prospective wage gains.
Among other resul ts, we observe that length of tenure is a highly significant determinant of job mobility. ~1ore surprising is the insignificance of the age-coefficient in the structural probit. Age is (inversely) correlated with rnobility gains (see Table 4 ), which partly may exp1ain this anomalous resul t. Finally, we can note that married workers have much lower probabilities of moving than those who are not married.
It is noteworthy that t.he average discount rates, Le., f(-) = f(1), F(o) = F(I). The estimates in column (4) of Table 2 have been used.
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have Pm = 0.125 and Ps = 0.071. As noted above, there is little reason to expect the two discount rates to be equal. The findingthat Pm is greater than P", is consistent with the conjecture that the 
instead of (12). rrhe relationship between the estimates in (12) and (27) will be a l ~ve just have to divide our estimated coefficients from (12) by the tax elastici ty to obtain estimates of responses to increases in real wage growth rates net of taxes. Likewise, we can easily compute mobility responses to changes in the progressivity of the tax system. We have bI (28) It is of some interestto note that (28) wan't to make the tax elastici ty endogenous . Such an approach, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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COJfCLUSIOIIS
We have analysed the determinants and consequences of individual mobility behavior in the Swedish labor marke-t. Since workers are likelyto move in response to their potential wage gains, there is a t'Vvo-way causaiity between mobility and wage growth. The econometric procedures utilized in this paper take this interdependence into account.
The results of the empirical analyses indicate that actual job movers obtain around 2 percentage points higher real wage growth compared to a situation where they had decided not to move. It is also interesting to see that potential mobility An interesting consequence of the adopted procedure is the possibility of estimatin<j structural decision equations, where hypothetical wa<je growth -25rates enter as arguments. vI/e find that workers respond to their "opportuni ty wages" in the expected direction.
A number of issues have been left out of focus in the present paper. For exarnple,the treatment of taxes has been illustrat.ive rather than thorough. (2) and (4) use values of experience calculated as EXP = AGE -S -7. Workers with unemp10yment experiences 1968-74 are not exc l uded in the samples.
